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Countering the Plaintiffs Anchor: 
Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages 
Arguments 
john Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, & David V Yokum* 
ABSTRACT: Numerous studies have shown that the amount of a juror's 
damages decision is strongly affected by the number suggested by the plaintiffs 
attorney, independent of the strength of the actual evidence ( a psychological 
effect known as "anchoring"). For scholars and policymakers, this behavior is 
worrisome for the legitimacy and accuracy of jury decisions, especially in the 
domain of non-economic damages (e.g., pain and suffering). One noted 
paper even concluded that "the more you ask for, the more you get. " Others 
believe that the damage demand must pass the "straight-face" test because 
outlandishly high demands will diminish credibility and risk the plaintiff 
losing outright. 
Can defendants effectively rebut an anchor? One strategy is for defendants to 
offer a "counter-anchor"-a much lower proposed damage award than the 
plaintiffs. However, defense attorneys worry that juries may interpret such a 
strategy as a concession of liability. Based on this fear, some defendants allow 
the plaintiffs anchor to go unrebutted. But this strategy, like counter-anchors, 
has not been rigorously studied. 
To answer these questions, we conducted a randomized controlled experiment 
in which we exposed mock jurors to a shortened medical malpractice trial, 
manipulated with six different sets of damages arguments in f actorial design. 
* John Campbell and Bernard Chao share the Hughes-Ruud Research Professorship at the
University of Denver. Professor Campbell is a Lawyering Process Professor at the Sturm College 
of Law, University of Denver. Professor Chao is an associate professor at the Sturm College of 
Law, University of Denver. Professor Robertson is an associate professor at James E. Rogers 
College of Law, University of Arizona. David Yokum graduated from the James E. College of Law 
and has a Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Arizona. Yokum is also a Fellow on the White 
House Social & Behavioral Sciences Team. 
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